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Demanding policy issues require responses that are both effective and legitimate. 
Wicked problems are examples of such demanding issues. In contrast to tame policy 
issues, wicked problems can be distinguished when levels of uncertainty, value 
divergence, and complexity reach high levels. Examples of wicked problems include 
issues such as climate change, illicit drug use, and indigenous disadvantage. This 
thesis puts forward the case for using deliberative democratic practices (in 
conjunction with typical policy development methods) when working with wicked 
problems.  
 
Deliberative democracy aims to promote greater legitimacy in decisions as a result of 
public consultation. Deliberative democracy can create better outcomes as a result of 
rigorous engagement and deliberation over a topic, and more inclusion in the political 
process for those groups who have typically found themselves alienated from politics. 
Such aims and principles lend themselves to good policy development. 
 
Typical policy development methods may not be sufficiently flexible to devise 
effective and long lasting solutions to wicked problems. By using deliberative 
practices in conjunction with typical policy development methods, the policy process 
becomes more flexible and adaptive to work with the ever-changing nature of a 
wicked problem. The principles and aims of deliberative democracy can make wicked 
problems appear more manageable by creating legitimacy in decisions as a result of 
public consultation, bridge the gap between different parties’ value divergence, and 
possibly even change the mind of participants in the deliberation by invoking thought 
and reason.  
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Policy development has experienced a number of radical changes throughout 
its history. Beginning, arguably, with the development of the method of ‘try 
and test’ from John Dewey (Radin 1997, 210), all the way to the introduction 
of statistical analysis during the behavioural revolution where political 
scientists struggled to come to terms with the recent uprising of quantitive 
methods of analysis (Heinemen 1979, 17). The above example displays the 
gradual evolution of policy development, and arguably, the nature of policy 
problems that now face governments may require further evolution of policy 
analysis. Typically, portfolio arrangements created by governments allow for 
policy areas to be divided up and categorised according to which department 
is best suited to work with the specific policy area. However, many policy 
problems today are far too broad and encompassing for this traditional method 
of development to work as effectively as it once did. There exist policy issues 
that include multiple departments, multiple stakeholders, and a vast amount of 
complexity that require a more adaptive method to explore possible solutions 
to these problems. These policy issues that encompass multiple different areas 
have been labeled wicked problems, and are casing significant trouble in good 
policy development.    
 
When exploring wicked problems and surrounding issues a deliberative 
democratic turn could be used to create help potentially create better 
outcomes for parties involved in policy development. Outcomes could be ! 2!
considered better for multiple reasons; firstly, decisions can appear more 
legitimate when those who are affected by the outcome have actually 
participated in the process, secondly, outcomes may be better thought out due 
to the intense engagement that is needed to deliberate, and thirdly, a far wider 
perspective on the policy could be gained through the inclusion of the greater 
public to possibly change the minds of even the most stalwart participants.  
 
To properly discuss this proposition the first chapter will discuss wicked 
problems by exploring the various elements that turn a tame policy issue into 
a wicked problem. This will consist of an analysis of the appropriate literature, 
and to further highlight the nature of a wicked problem, contemporary 
examples of policy challenges experienced at both the national and 
international level will be provided to portray each element of a wicked 
problem. The second chapter will provide a theoretical basis of deliberative 
democracy. This will consist of the appropriate model and principles that I 
argue lend themselves to working with wicked problems. In particular, this 
chapter will explore the principles of reciprocity to strengthen engagement, 
where legitimacy stems from in a deliberative democracy, and how 
deliberative democracy can unite society by including segments of society 
that have typically found themselves alienated from the political process. The 
third (and final chapter) will discuss how the model of deliberative democracy 
outlined in the second chapter may create potentially better outcomes to 
wicked problems. The benefits of using such deliberative practices include the 
ability to bridge typically divided sectors of the community, decisions may 
appear more legitimate as those who are affected have participated in the ! 3!
process, and the engagement of deliberation may change the minds of 
typically stalwart individuals. 
 
The Elements of a Wicked Problem – Contemporary Examples 
 
The idea of a wicked problem does not stem from public policy. Rather, it was 
a concept introduced into the field of urban planning (Head 2008, 101). The 
term was derived to label problems that proved particularly difficult to deal 
with. Indeed, the label wicked does not denote some sort of evilness to the 
problem (APSC 2007, 3), but rather used in the sense that solutions to the 
problem are not so readily available. Broadly, wicked problems tend to 
include a trifecta of problematic elements, namely: uncertainty, value 
divergence, and complexity (Head 2008, 104). To properly illustrate the 
nature of a wicked each of these elements will be explored separately in the 
first chapter.  
 
To highlight the essence of each of the three elements the first chapter will 
discuss how they relate to contemporary Australian and international issues 
that frequently invoke debate among the wider public. The policy issue of 
climate change will be used to highlight uncertainty, illicit drug use will be 
used to detail value divergence, and indigenous disadvantage will be used to 
discuss complexity. While each of these issues is an example of wicked policy 
in itself, they will be used for the sole purpose of discussing each facet of a 
wicked problem.   
 ! 4!
The policy problem of climate change has created a sense of uncertainty 
among citizens and the administration. Whilst there remains little doubt that 
climate change is being caused by greenhouse gas emissions (each level of 
Australian government has adopted the view of the wider scientific 
community that most of the warming over the last fifty years is man made 
(IPPC 2001, para. 3)), there remains huge uncertainty in both how to lower 
greenhouse gas emissions, and just what the effects of climate change could 
be. This uncertainty has led to what has been described as chaos in Canberra 
(Scott, 2011) over how best to lower carbon emissions. Furthermore, the 
recent media attention on the carbon tax seems to have simply polarised the 
debate between the two major parties (Kenny 2011, para. 16), with citizens 
entrenching themselves in the view of whichever party they have typically 
voted for. As a result, this has created mere skin-deep analysis of the real 
issues at hand, with no real focus or engagement occurring on an issue that 
has put clouds of uncertainty over the continued viability of our planet.   
 
Illicit drug use highlights a clear divergence of values between the population. 
There remains doubt over the best course of action to take, that is, whether or 
not drugs are outlawed completely showing their illegality and wrongfulness, 
or whether use should be decriminalised by allowing users to inject 
themselves in safe rooms and under supervision to minimise harm. The 
Western Australian State Government only recently released new laws 
relating to the possession of cannabis (Jones, 2011), that appear to put strong 
criminal penalties against the use and possession of cannabis. As a result, 
many citizens have voiced there concerns about the harshness of the new ! 5!
laws, with many arguing that the government should put more focus on drug 
education (Donaldson, 2011). Here, there is a value divergence in the 
approach used to develop policy as well, as it makes a large difference as to 
whether policy deliberations are framed in a medical or legal discourse 
(Fischer 2003, 43). The laws (and development) have created a clear value 
divergence among the community, and there has been little engagement 
between government and citizens on the issue.  
 
Indigenous disadvantage is a clear example of just how complex policy issues 
can become. The nature of the problem presents a myriad of issues (including 
health and welfare) that spreads across multiple departments. Cross-
departmental communication can be hazardous due to the top-down chain of 
accountability that has been created by the Westminster style of government 
that has led to governmental departments and agencies being described as 
‘vertical silos’ (MAC 2004, 50). This has led to a style of policy development 
where information on an issue is shared only within one department, even if 
the particular issue encompasses many. To highlight this point, in 2007 John 
Howard mentioned to the then indigenous affairs minister Mal Brough that he 
was thinking about ‘cutting off the grog to the Northern Territory’ (Johns 
2008, 70). It was up to Brough and his senior officers to develop a policy on 
how to alleviate the problems experiences by indigenous Australians in 
remote communities. By the next Thursday cabinet meeting the Northern 
Territory intervention package was born (Johns 2008, 70). Such a response 
did not have the necessary time, communication, or engagement that effective 
policy development needs. Complex issues, such as indigenous affairs, ! 6!
present an opportunity where those who are actually affected by a policy 
outcome (such as Indigenous Australians) can actually be a party to policy 
development so that real stories and perspectives can be gained on a highly 
complex issue.  
 
A Theoretical Basis for Deliberative Democracy 
 
Deliberative democracy is a concept that aims to empower all citizens in a 
decision making process. Rather than allowing policy or law to be decided by 
bargaining between competing interests (Parkinson 2003, 180), deliberative 
democracy aims to engage the participants so that nothing but the weight of 
the better argument is left to decide the outcome (Habermas 1975, 108). There 
are three elements of deliberative democracy that may lend themselves to 
potentially better outcomes when dealing with wicked problems. These are 
engagement, difference, and legitimacy.  
 
The idea of reciprocity is comprised of two different streams: procedural and 
substantive reciprocity. Engaging with a discussion is an essential element of 
deliberative democracy, and this cannot be achieved without reciprocity and 
effective communication. Briefly, if participants to deliberative democracy are 
to be reciprocal; they must listen and accept other participant’s arguments, 
even if they are contrary to their own (Held 2006, 233), and accept also accept 
that if an outcome is reached that is contrary to their argument, the legitimacy 
stands as they have agreed to the procedure that was used to reach it. If 
participants uphold the idea of reciprocity then true engagement with the issue ! 7!
will be achieved. Deliberation will become involved, and the issue will be 
discussed with an open mind that is agreeable to consensus. The second 
chapter will discuss the importance of both these principles in a foundation of 
deliberative democracy.  
 
Deliberative democracy aims to draw upon the vast knowledge that is 
available among the wide standing population. While difference has often 
been considered a barrier to democracy, deliberative democracy considers 
difference as paramount to gaining a better understanding of an issue. By 
drawing on the personal experiences of citizens who are truly affected by a 
problem through the use of story telling and rhetoric, one can gain new 
perspective on the issue and understand it in ways that they may never have 
considered themselves. In particular, the works of Young provide useful 
insight into how the narrative techniques of story telling and greeting can 
complement arguments in a deliberative democracy, as they tend to be more 
egalitarian than typical deliberative processes (Young 1996, 132).  
 
Legitimacy remains one of the most important elements of a democratic 
theory. Deliberative democracy draws its legitimacy from the citizenry 
themselves. Outcomes are considered legitimate to the extent that those who 
want to deliberate on an issue are given the opportunity to (Dryzek 2001, 
651). Arguably, this gives deliberative democracy a stronger claim in being 
more legitimate when compared to a representative democracy, as quite often 
the views of the electorate on any issue will differ from their elected 
representative, and as it is a representative democracy their voice is silenced ! 8!
somewhat until the next election (d’Entreves 2002, 45). Also, the final 
outcome of deliberation is not set in stone. If new information arises or if 
there remains discontent over an outcome, there is no reason why an issue 
cannot be deliberated again. The use of deliberative democracy makes 
decisions appear more legitimate, as the people themselves have deliberated 
on the issues that affect them, rather than a set of elected representatives.   
 
The Case for Deliberative Democracy to work with Wicked Problems 
 
The principles of deliberative democracy lend themselves to potentially better 
outcomes when working with wicked problems. The very nature of a wicked 
problem is that it is complex, contains elements of uncertainty, and will have 
multiple stakeholders that will undoubtedly differ in their values. By 
proposing that deliberative practices could be used when working with wicked 
problems, I do not suggest that the right outcome will always be achieved. I 
use the term right in the sense of a clear distinction between a right and wrong 
policy outcome. The literature suggests that there is never a right or wrong 
outcome when dealing with wicked problems; rather solutions should be 
viewed as ‘better, worse, or good enough’ (APSC 2007, 4). I believe that by 
using deliberative democracy when working with wicked problems, the 
outcomes could be considered better for multiple reasons.    
 
Firstly, decisions may appear more legitimate in the eyes of the people as they 
have had their voices and opinions heard on the matter. The final outcome 
will be a result of a collective deliberation where stakeholders have engaged ! 9!
with the issue to reach a reasoned conclusion. The process of Australian 
politics can often disillusion citizens, as often the community is not consulted 
regarding issues that affect their interests. By consulting with the community 
in a deliberative manner this can build stronger legitimacy claims to an 
outcome that is reached due to the community strengthening aspects of 
deliberative practices, whilst complementing the typical policy process by 
educating various parties about aspects of the issue they may not have 
previously considered.    
 
Secondly, the process allows for a wide and diverse range of people to put 
forward their own views and opinions on a topic, and more importantly, their 
own stories on how the issue has affected them. This helps to bridge the gap 
between divided viewpoints, allowing parties who are typically opposed to 
each (due to value divergence, race, ethnicity etc.) to deliberate contentious 
issues responsibly (with no resort to violence) to the point of reaching sound 
outcomes. Some wicked problems, such as illicit drug use, encompass views 
on morality and what it is to be moral. This can be a contentious and hostile 
issue, as with many moral issues, however, in the appropriate deliberative 
setting deliberation can bridge the gap between these parties.   
 
Finally, the engagement with an issue that participants to deliberative 
democracy create when debating an issue can develop a far better 
understanding on the issue and provide better thought out outcomes to the 
policy problem. This could potentially lead parties involved in the 
deliberation to change their mind about how they see the issue, and what they ! 10!
believe to the appropriate way forward. As with many policy issues, when a 
party does not engage with other viewpoints on the issue, they can often just 
become more entrenched within their own. This can be counter-productive to 
good policy development, as the debate will simply be polarised between the 
two viewpoints with no real progress being made towards an outcome. 
Deliberative practices help to alleviate this issue by making participants think 
and dwell on points raised by other members that they themselves may not 
have previously considered.    
 
Again, the aim of this discussion is not to argue that deliberative democracy 
replace Australia’s current system of governance and policy development. 
Rather, it can complement it when working with wicked problems. The aims 
and practices of deliberative democracy can make the very elements that turn 
a policy issue into a wicked problem appear more manageable. Issues can 
appear less complex after much deliberation on the topic, and even if there 
remains uncertainty surrounding the potential consequences of a policy 
direction, the decision will remain legitimate as it was a result of consensus 
from deliberation. Again, to further strengthen the legitimacy of the outcome, 
the divergence of values between parties can be bridged by the practices of 
deliberation. These advantages from the use of deliberative practices all lead 
to good policy development, and is why I argue that deliberation, when used 
with current policy development methods, can lead to better policy outcomes.Chapter One – The Nature of a Wicked 
Problem 
 
This chapter will outline the nature of a wicked problem, and what turns a 
tame policy issue into a wicked problem. Rittel and Webber (1973) have 
identified seven distinguishing features of a wicked problem that separate it 
from any other policy issue: 
 
1.  There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem 
2.  Wicked problems have no definitive solution 
3.  Solutions to wicked problems are viewed as good or bad, rather than 
true or false 
4.  There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution for a wicked 
problem 
5.  Every wicked problem is essentially unique 
6.  Every wicked problem can be considered a symptom of another 
problem 
7.  The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be 
explained in numerous ways  
 
In addition to this, Head has argued that these features can be broken down 
into three broader elements; uncertainty, value divergence, and complexity ! 12!
(Head 2008, 103). When a policy issue encompasses high levels of each of 
these elements, it then moves into the realm of wickedness.  
 
To fully discuss the nature of a wicked problem I will explore each element 
separately to properly illustrate the dimensions of uncertainty, value 
divergence, and complexity. This will be done by providing contemporary 
policy challenges that encompass the particular element. The element of 
uncertainty will be discussed in relation to climate change policy. Climate 
change policy best exemplifies the element of uncertainty due to the high 
levels of doubt surrounding the economic, social, and scientific knowledge 
that is currently available. The challenge of value divergence will be 
discussed in relation to illicit drug use. Illicit drug use remains a contentious 
issue in society, with opinions divided over the best course of action between 
a decriminalised harm minimisation scheme, or to outlaw drugs completely 
due to their immoral nature. Finally, complexity will be discussed in relation 
to Indigenous disadvantage. Indigenous disadvantage remains a constant issue 
where no solution is readily available. The policy dilemma encompasses 
multiple governmental departments, and historically, the treatment of 
Indigenous Australians has been poor.  
 
The Element of Uncertainty in a Wicked Problem 
 
Uncertainty itself is a difficult element to explore as it cannot be considered 
an entity in itself, but rather it is a description of the unknown dimensions 
involved when contemplating the outcome of a possible course of action ! 13!
(Harte 2001, 176). Indeed, uncertainty plays on the mind of policy developers 
as policy itself is judged on its effectiveness in the real world, and as quite 
often policy makers are accountable to the public at large, they want to be 
sure that the final outcome of the decision is successful. The desired 
successful outcome becomes more and more difficult to determine when the 
breadth of the problem become wider, because as the as the problem itself 
grows the uncertainty surrounding it grows with it (Heazle 2010, 33). The 
driving force behind such uncertainty is our perception, we think we know 
what will happen if go through with action X, but we can never be entirely 
sure: 
 
The state of uncertainty is fundamentally a human quality because it refers to how 
we associate our perceptions of the world with our expectations of how we find the 
world to be. In the absence of perception, there is no uncertainty. When our 
perceptions suggest that only one outcome is possible, there is no uncertainty and we 
are sure. (Pielke 2007, 23) 
 
When developing policy it is the risk itself of creating a failed policy that 
drives the uncertainty.  This is why, in terms of risk perception, that it is never 
possible to have risk without uncertainty, as uncertainty is a prerequisite of 
risk (Heazle 2010, 36).  
 
Risk can be classified within a system in order to manage it more effectively. 
In this system uncertainty can be classified as either open or closed (Heazle 
2010, 33). Within a closed system the uncertainty itself has boundaries, that 
is, we know the exact number of possible outcomes due to the framing of the 
uncertainty. For example, a game of chance such as heads or tails is classified 
as a closed system of uncertainty. This system is much more manageable as ! 14!
gaps in our knowledge can be filled through research and experimentation. 
The uncertainty is such that although we can prepare for likely outcomes 
based on statistical analysis, we can never be entirely sure what the outcome 
will actually be (Heazle 2010, 34). 
 
In contrast to the closed system, there exists the open system of uncertainty 
that is of more concern to policy developers. In an open system of uncertainty 
policy developers are not only uncertain about what they know, but also 
uncertain about what they do not know. In effect, they are uncertain about the 
uncertainty itself (Heazle 2010, 34). The range of possible outcomes within an 
open system of uncertainty is not quantifiable, and policy developers will 
often vary in opinion when determining how best to approach the policy 
problem. When working in an open system of uncertainty policy developers 
must make sure that they do not fall into the trap of ignorance. There needs to 
be recognition that what is not known is not known (Wynne 1992, 113). 
Ignorance increases when the degree of action or commitment based on what 
we think we know increases (Wynne 1992, 113). By falling into the trap of 
ignorance policy developers will potentially create insecure policy that may 
lead to undesired outcomes.  
 
A clear example of a highly open system of uncertainty is climate change. 
Due to the high complexity of global weather systems, any predictions that 
are made need to be painted out as highly speculative scenarios (Heazle 2010, 
34). Policy developers play a highly dangerous game when any potential 
scenario put forward on climate change is treated as fact (Heazle 2010, 34). ! 15!
There needs to be clear distinction drawn between the two, otherwise policy 
developers will simply fall into the trap of ignorance.  
 
Uncertainty in Context – Climate Change in Australia and Globally 
 
The issue of climate change can be is of such uncertainty that it can be 
classified within an open system of uncertainty. The open uncertainty of 
climate change can be broken down into three different forms of uncertainty; 
scientific, social, and economic (Johnson et al 2001, 43). This section will 
explore how each of these areas of uncertainty is currently affecting Australia 
in developing a policy response to climate change.   
 
•  Scientific Uncertainty 
 
There appears to be fairly solid consensus that the increase in greenhouse gas 
emissions over the last fifty years has altered the climate (IPCC 2001, para 
5.), however, due to the complexity of global weather systems it is still 
incredibly difficult to establish any clear future climate trend (Heazle 2010, 
34). In effect, scientists cannot predict the weather.  
 
That is not to say that we nothing about climate change, but rather, for all that 
we think we know, we are uncertain. Large-scale global mapping systems 
have been established to observe and track any changes in important variables 
such as surface air temperate, the atmosphere, and sea levels (Berliner 2003, 
431). However, there are various interactions between the climatic sub-! 16!
systems that are simply too complex to even try to track (variables between 
the ocean, the atmosphere, ice, and land processes)(Berliner 2003, 431). 
Ultimately, any climate model created is just that, a model. The models 
created are inexact and include a variety of uncertain quantities and 
parametres (Berliner 2003, 431). Policy developers walk a dangerous line 
when these models are treated as fact, in effect; they are falling into the 
ignorance trap of uncertainty.   
 
There remains no means to observe and track previous data on the issue as the 
Earth stands alone on climate change (that we know of). It is a unique planet 
within the universe, and as a result we have no collection of similar planets to 
which we can observe, assign treatments, and compare responses (Berliner 
2003, 431). As a result of the Earth’s uniqueness there have also been calls 
that perhaps the warming we are experiencing is simply an example of the 
climate variability that occurs in the Earth’s climate (Latif 2011, 1). Whilst 
the climate variability theory does not have huge support among the scientific 
community, it does reflect the need for more improved understanding and 
research into the Earth’s climate systems so that more solid models can be 
created to instill some certainty in the scientific community (Latif 2011, 6).  
 
•  Social Uncertainty 
 
The issue of climate change is one that deeply divides the community. Many 
citizens are becoming confused over the conflicting evidence that is being 
produced by parties who believe climate change is happening, and by those ! 17!
who do not. To demonstrate, whilst the Department of Climate Change and 
Energy Efficiency state that climate change is human induced (DCCEE 2011), 
there remains doubters in society, such as the website Climategate. 
Climategate states that ‘Anthropogenic global warming is history’s biggest 
scam’ (Climategate 2011), and remains stalwart on this stance citing various 
sources of evidence for their claim. Indeed, it seems that for all the scientific 
evidence that one party will put forward to strengthen their claim, the other 
party will counter with their own evidence. This only creates confusion 
among the community as to who they should believe.  
 
From statistical analysis it seems that in order to gain some guidance over 
their uncertainty, citizens seem to be turning to their political parties whom 
they have traditionally followed. Recent figures show that support for left-
wing political beliefs is associated with greater belief in human induced 
climate change and with higher levels of concern about the effects of climate 
change (a survey conducted by the CSIRO showed that those most likely to 
think that climate change is happening largely due to human activity were 
Greens voters at 82%, and Labor voters at 63%) (Leviston et al. 2011, 6).  
 
With little else to turn to, it seems that the population have simply adopted 
their party lines over the issue of climate change. Since 2007 when Kevin 
Rudd became Prime Minister as leader of the Labor Party, the Labor Party has 
developed (or at least tried to develop) various policies to counter climate 
change (such as the creation of the Department of Climate Change and Energy 
Efficiency). Meanwhile, there is still some skepticism within the Liberal ! 18!
Party. So much so that the then leader, Malcolm Turnball, was ousted as 
leader due to his support of Kevin Rudd’s emissions reduction scheme. There 
remains some doubt within the Liberal Party over climate change, with some 
members refusing to believe that climate change is a real and pressing issue 
(Franklin 2009). The political uncertainty surrounding the issue has spilled 
out into the wider public to create further social uncertainty. This is 
exemplified in a memo written by Republican strategist Frank Lutz to the then 
US president George W. Bush: 
 
Voters believe that there is no consensus about global warming within the scientific 
community. Should the public come to believe that the scientific issues are settled, 
their views about global warming will accordingly…therefore, you need to make the 
lack of scientific uncertainty a primary issue in the debate. (Quiggan 2008, 207) 
 
Back in Australia we are witnessing the two major parties still in 
disagreement over Gillard and Labor’s proposed carbon tax. The issue is 
dividing not only Canberra, but also the whole nation. The issue has 
snowballed to the point where there are questions put over Gillard’s 
leadership, with every move she makes is coming under scrutiny. 
 
•  Economic Uncertainty 
 
Environmentalist’s hopes that some sort of global economic agreement on 
emissions reduction could be reached at Copenhagen in 2009 were somewhat 
dashed by the continual lack of agreement between nations in attendance 
(Williams 2010), however the conference in Cancun was somewhat of a step 
forward. The disagreement stems from growing economic power nations ! 19!
(such as India and China) who do not want to jeopardise their development by 
setting themselves stringent emissions targets (McKibbin 2009, 465). Also, 
developed nations cannot readily commit to any target reduction either, as 
unforeseen economic growth can quite quickly offset any target reduction that 
is actually reached: 
No one expected during the 1997 negotiations that a decade later New Zealand 
would be facing a dramatic rise in Asian demand for beef and diary products. The 
impact of increasing methane emissions in New Zealand has been so large that it has 
completely offset the reductions New Zealand was able to achieve in the early 
1990’s. (McKibbin 2009, 464).   
 
The lack of certainty surrounding a nations economic growth prevents any 
substantial agreement that can be made to try and reduce emissions. It seems 
that ultimately, a nation will not want to jeopardise any short-term economic 
growth in order to mitigate any potential long-term damage by an uncertain 
issue.  
 
The Element of Value Divergence in a Wicked Problem 
 
As outlined earlier, one of the criterions for a problem to cross the threshold 
into wickedness is value divergence (Head 2008, 104). The term value 
divergence is not a mere descriptive for a disagreement between two 
stakeholders over a policy issue, but rather refers to a deep seeded moral 
conflict between two or more parties who see their own values and moral 
systems at stake over the outcome of the policy. With this framework in mind, 
it is easy to see how difficult it can be to manage value divergence over a 
policy issue. Hume has suggested that there would be no moral conflict if 
social resources were less scarce or human nature more generous (Gutmann et ! 20!
al. 2000, 18). Hume raises an interesting point, however, Gutmann argues that 
scarce resources and human nature are not the only sources of moral 
disagreement. Gutmann states that an incompatible value system and an 
incomplete understanding only diverge parties to the issue further (Gutmann 
et al. 2000, 18).  
 
Gutmann states that politicians and citizens alike fall into the same trap of 
viewing moral disagreement in terms of a conflict between persons who 
pursue different ends; the rich against the poor, the self interested against the 
public minded, the climate skeptics against the environmentalists (Gutmann et 
al. 2000, 23). To do this seriously understates the scope of moral conflict, and 
suggests that any moral conflict will simply be resolved by unlimited 
resources. There needs to be a recognition that the conflict does not originate 
from the persons, but from the values themselves (Gutmann et al. 2000, 23).  
Gutmann argues that difficulty will generally be met whenever moral 
disagreement enters the realm of policy development: 
 
Finding the right resolution becomes more difficult when moral values conflict, and 
a conflict among values readily turns into a conflict among persons, as citizens come 
to different conclusions about the same decisions and policies (Gutmann et al 2000, 
24).  
 
When there is a divergence in values between parties there will generally be 
an incomplete understanding of the issues that are at hand by each party to the 
issue. One must accept that we live in a state of moral conflict over many 
issues that we do not, and will find great difficulty in finding, a correct answer 
to. Some moral conflicts will have a uniquely correct solution, and some may 
not: ! 21!
We should not expect to resolve all or even most moral conflicts. If incompatible 
value and incomplete understanding are as endemic to human politics as scarcity and 
limited generosity, then the problem of moral disagreement is a condition which we 
must learn to live with, not merely an obstacle to be overcome on the way to a just 
society. (Gutmann et al. 2000, 26).  
 
That is to say, if everyone were to be completely benevolent then there would 
still be some discrepancy given to the various factors that weigh in, moral and 
empirical, to any public policy decision (Gutmann et al. 2000, 25). 
 
Value Divergence in Context – Illicit Drug Policy 
 
Illicit drug policy itself can be viewed in a myriad of ways, so much so that it 
has led some commentators to describe it as an example of a ‘policy zoo’ 
(Doessel et al. 2008, 239).  Marks has categorised illicit drug policy into four 
different dimensions: 
 
For some, drugs are just another commodity, albeit with certain attributes not shared 
with most other commodities. This position can be described as libertarian. Second, 
some others regard drugs as a “Faustian ambrosia”, leading to unconstrained 
pleasure and loss of self control. Thus drug policy becomes a moral issue. A third 
conception is that drugs can be a vector for disease and a fourth approach is to regard 
them as analgesics. The third and fourth approaches treat illicit drug policy as a 
health issue. (Marks 1990, 68).  
 
This section will deal primarily with the second position, regarding illicit drug 
policy as a moral issue containing value judgments. It has been noted that this 
facet of drug policy is rarely recognised within the literature (Doessel 2008, 
239). Firstly I will explore the prohibitionists’ beliefs, and then I will move on 
to those who argue for harm minimisation (who can be somewhat divided 
between themselves).  
 ! 22!
  The Criminalisation of Drugs – The Point for Prohibition 
 
The main argument for the criminalisation of drugs is to show their illegality, 
and that the taking of mood altering drugs for recreational purposes is wrong. 
Indeed, the point for prohibition has received some high profile support over 
the years including former Prime Minister John Howard, who stated in the 
House of Representatives: 
 
It is no secret that Major Watters adopts the view, as do many others, including 
myself, that the policy of zero tolerance of drug taking in this country is a wholly 
credible policy and a policy that ought to be pursued more vigorously by government 
and by people who are concerned about the problem (Australia, House of 
Representatives, 1998, 3564).  
 
The aim of prohibition is deterrence. By threatening potential drug users and 
dealers with potential gaol time, it is believed that this will act as deterrence to 
engaging with illicit drugs. The fundamental basis for this belief is that drugs 
are morally wrong as they present unnecessary harm to the user, unnecessary 
harm to the surrounding community, and transfer too great a burden to the 
community from resulting addiction and other mind altering side-effects 
(Drug Free Australia 2010, 1). It is from this line of thought (that drug use 
causes too much damage to the community) that prohibitionists argue a liberal 
line of thought to drugs is too short sighted (Dalrymple 2005, 1). Those who 
cite Mill against the prohibitionist argument on the debate on drugs:  
 
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member 
of a civilized (sic) community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own 
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant (Mill 1859, 68) 
 ! 23!
Neglect to see the damage that drug users cause around them, whether it be 
the further social burden placed on the community, or the emotional distress 
of a family member who is forced to witness a loved one slowly destroy their 
own life (Dalrymple 2005, 3).  
 
It is true that the illegality of drugs is what causes drug users criminalisation. 
However, the same be said that the illegality of stealing cars is what creates 
car thieves (Dalrymple 2005, 3). This shows that ultimately, the cause of all 
criminality is the law, and as yet no one has called for the complete 
abandonment of the law. As it stands, the use and selling of drugs is illegal for 
the benefit of the community and the individual, and as it the law it should be 
respected.  
 
  Harm Reduction Strategies – The User is a Patient, Not a Criminal 
 
Harm reduction policy rose to prominence around the 1980’s when people 
wanted to challenge the status quo of drug prohibition (Doessel 2008, 204). 
The term harm reduction itself has been met with some debate, with many 
commentators failing to come to consensus as to just what it entails. For 
example, Newcombe has put forward the following explanation of harm 
reduction policy: 
 
Harm reduction…is a social policy which prioritises the aim of decreasing the 
negative effects of drug use (Newcombe 1992, 56) 
 
Newcombe’s statement was met with some criticism. The main objection to 
this statement came from Single who believed that it was far too broad and ! 24!
could encompass any program that aimed to decrease the negative effects of 
drug use, even gaol (Single 1995, 288). A more narrow definition was given 
by Heather, who included the caveat that harm was to be reduced without 
necessarily decreasing consumption: 
 
The essential feature of a harm reduction strategy is that it involves an attempt to 
ameliorate the adverse health, social, or economic consequences of mood altering 
substances…harm reduction is distinguished…by its emphasis on decreasing 
problems rather than decreasing consumption itself (Heather et al. 1993, 3).  
 
Thus, harm reduction seeks to reduce the imminent danger that a drug user 
puts themselves in as a result of their choice of actions.  
 
Harm reduction has been described as a value neutral shift in policy (Pauly 
2008, 4). This is not to say that it is void of its own values, but that it aims to 
eliminate the moral judgment of drug users and see them as people rather than 
deviants (Tuukka 2007, 85) who simply need help, whilst espousing its own 
values through its principles (Pauly 2009, 6).  Tukka argues that by 
criminalising drug users we only continue to further stigmatise them during a 
time when they need help: 
 
For as long as our society comprises of individuals who discriminate against drug 
addicts…addicts will continue to be an ever increasing body of people who exist 
outside society…it is necessary to adopt a policy that is assimilative, rather than 
coercive, that seeks to integrate drug users into society rather than marginalise them 
(Tukka 2007, 85-86). 
 
Harm reduction looks past discrepancies and recognises the intrinsic moral 
worth of all individuals, whilst not condoning the harsh moral judgment of 
those experiencing drug problems. Harm reduction believes that resources ! 25!
shouldn’t be rationed based on those who deserve the care, as it believes that 
everyone is deserving of care.   
 
The Element of Complexity in a Wicked Problem 
 
The final element of a wicked problem that needs to be discussed is 
complexity. Complexity within policy development can be quite 
overwhelming. The issue at hand will often look far too big to be able to deal 
with alone, and will often involve inter-related problems with multiple 
definitions and potential solutions. In a way, complexity is almost a 
combination of uncertainty and value divergence. Roe has given the following 
outline of complexity: 
 
To many analysts, complexity is the issue’s internal intricacy and/or its 
interdependence with other policy issues. (Roe 1998, 14).  
 
Whilst this outline is accurate, I would like to expand the notion of 
complexity into three different areas; problem formulation, an unlimited 
amount of solutions, and related problems. 
 
Complexity begins with problem formulation itself. Quite often the debates 
surrounding the policy issue are ever changing to the shifting nature of the 
problem, which makes defining the problem and locating the source of the 
problem extremely difficult (Martin 1998, 177). This is due to the inter-
relatedness of the policy issue itself. These days, many policy dilemmas 
spread across multiple departments requiring cross communication between 
the various agencies. If a potential source of the problem is found and ! 26!
removed then this can just create another problem, of which the previous 
problem was simply a symptom: 
 
The process of resolving the [policy] problem starts with the search for the causal 
explanation of the discrepancy [between the current and the desired]. Removal of 
that cause poses another problem of which the original problem is a “symptom”. 
(Martin 1998, 188-189).  
 
 Similarly, the initial problem at hand may even be a symptom of an even 
larger problem still. This makes the development of solutions difficult, as the 
wider and more complex the problem is, the wider and more complex the 
solutions are. Since the range of possible solutions is unknown, this in effect, 
makes the range of solutions unlimited (Martin 1998, 186).  
 
The nature of complexity itself can be overwhelming for policy developers, 
often not even knowing where to begin when tackling a complex policy issue.  
 
Complexity in Context – Indigenous Disadvantage in Australia 
 
The amount of indigenous disadvantage in Australia is quite alarming, with 
high mortality rates, welfare dependency, and low levels of education rife in 
indigenous communities (urban, rural, and remote) (Mazel 2009, 475).  At 
birth Indigenous Australians are expected to live to the age of 67.2 for males 
and 72.9 for females. Alarmingly, this is 11.5 years less than a non-
Indigenous male and 9.7 years less for a non indigenous female (ABS 2010). 
In terms of education, in the period between 2003-2007, 36% of Indigenous 
Australians at the age of 19 had completed year 12, compared to 74% of non-
Indigenous Australians. Finally, during 2006 the Indigenous Australian rate ! 27!
for chronic health problems that rendered assistance (communication, 
mobility, aided care etc.) was twice that of non-Indigenous Australians (ABS 
2010). Indigenous disadvantage is very complex in that it spreads across 
multiple areas (health, economic, and education to name three). However, 
even more complex is finding the root cause of the problem, and the solution. 
 
There have been suggestions that the complex nature of indigenous 
disadvantage has been born out of the complexity of indigenous political 
identity; the struggle to maintain their own traditional identity, whilst trying to 
keep up with the ever-changing nature of non-Indigenous society: 
 
Aboriginal people today grapple with the often-uncomfortable intersection of their 
fractured (but not abandoned) traditional and cultural life, the legacies of 
colonization, and their own diversity across the continent. These intersections of 
history, culture, experience and identity have produced an extraordinarily complex 
political culture that, in general, is very poorly understood by non-aboriginal people. 
(Maddison 2009, xxvi) 
 
The media exemplifies this misunderstanding of indigenous political culture. 
Indigenous disadvantage in Australia is a complex issue, however, the media 
have the tendency to beat the issue up as simple welfare problem claiming 
that Indigenous Australians have a culture of reliance of welfare (Maddison 
2009, xxix). This only makes the problem even more difficult to deal with, as 
the general public take on the view of the media and become disillusioned 
with the government over the lack of results: 
   
Journalists seem intent on presenting the view that Aboriginal people are all like 
minded and where there is a difference of views it is interpreted as meaning that 
‘Aboriginal people are not organized, don’t know what they’re talking about, they 
need to get their act together, and who cares anyway? …This type of representation 
is indicative of how far Australian society needs to come in their understanding of 
Aboriginal culture. (Maddison 2009, xxix).  ! 28!
 
We need to better understand the complexity of Indigenous Australian culture 
before we can tackle the complexity of Indigenous disadvantage. While some 
praised the Northern Territory intervention for finally taking action over a 
serious issue, others viewed it as too rash and dramatic a policy (Mazel 2009, 
478), which simply aimed undermining the local Indigenous knowledge of the 
communities and kin-ship system. Inclusion in the policy making process may 
alleviate some of this complexity, however I will explore this at a later point 
in the discussion.  
 
Conclusion 
 
By exploring each of the three elements to a wicked problem separately a 
clear indication of the difficulty surrounding policy development is given. 
When a policy issue encompasses just one of these elements policy 
development becomes difficult, but when all three are present the problem 
shifts into the realm of wickedness. However, more often that not the 
elements work together within the web of the policy issue. As is seen from the 
policy examples given; the uncertainty of climate change adds to the 
complexity of the issue as well, as with indigenous disadvantage we can never 
be certain that a policy direction within such a complex issue will be a 
successful one.   
 
Value divergence presents an interesting element. Whilst the divergence of 
values does add to the overall difficulty of the problem, it does present an ! 29!
opportunity to expand our realms of understanding on the issue. There are 
inherent dangers when a policy issue is framed too narrowly, as this will lead 
to a limited understanding of the issue by failing to consider other dimensions. 
By forcing policy developers to consider other values, the value divergence 
element has left room for deliberative practices to potentially alleviate both 
complexity and uncertainty through the benefits attributed with deliberation, 
however this will be explored at a later point of the discussion.Chapter Two – The Guiding Principles of 
Deliberative Democracy 
 
 
 
There are three principles inherent to any analysis of deliberative democracy. 
These are legitimacy, difference, and engagement. This chapter will explore 
each of these before I relate them to wicked problems in the final chapter of 
this thesis. It should be taken that these three principles are not stand-alone 
pillars of deliberative democracy. As this discussion will show, each of these 
principles are closely interconnected with each other, working together in 
order to promote a theory of democracy that is concerned with better 
understanding of issues, mutual respect between citizens, and effective policy 
responses. 
 
Legitimacy within Deliberative Democracy 
 
Whilst there has been a huge focus on the advancement of deliberative 
democracy, there have been suggestions that, on the face it, the idea is 
practically impossible (Dryzek 2001, 651). This criticism stems from the 
claims of the legitimacy that deliberative democrats make. Cohen’s classic 
formulation of legitimacy in deliberative democracy states the position well. 
He argues that: 
   
[O]utcomes are legitimate to the extent they receive reflective assent through 
participation in authentic deliberation by all those subject to the decision in question. 
(Cohen 1989, 18) 
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Critics make the point that while deliberative democracy claims legitimacy in 
numbers, that is, the more people who deliberate, the more legitimate the 
process appears (Parkinson 2003, 181), there appears to be an irreconcilable 
tension between this legitimacy and deliberation itself. The conflict lies in 
numbers, as the more people who take part in the deliberation process, the 
more likely it is that the deliberation process breaks down. Obviously 
deliberation is imperative to deliberative democracy, thus it is important to 
have procedures in place that ensure effective deliberation. Often this point is 
overlooked, as some authors tend to throw the term deliberation around quite 
loosely. One must remember that deliberation is more than just delivering a 
speech to an audience. It is an interaction of various viewpoints with the aim 
to converse and educate (Parkinson 2003, 181). Many theorists fall into the 
trap of claiming that public forums are deliberative when they actually aren’t. 
This tension between deliberation and legitimacy has been labeled the scale 
problem of deliberative democracy: 
 
Beyond a very small of number of participants (certainly fewer than twenty) 
deliberation breaks down with speech making replacing conversation and rhetorical 
appeals replacing reasoned arguments…However, the decisions appear illegitimate 
for those left outside the forum. (Parkinson 2003, 181).  
 
The scale problem requires a balancing act between the numbers of 
representatives/participants to the deliberative process, whilst maintaining an 
appropriate number of participants preventing the deliberation from turning 
into a forum. The question remains, how can this tension be resolved?  
 
There have been suggestions there that should be a restriction in the number 
of times that the people deliberate, such as matters concerning the constitution ! 32!
or that of social justice (Dryzek 2001, 653). This solution does not eliminate 
the scale problem; it simply reduces the amount of times that it will need to be 
dealt with. The number of citizens participating in the deliberation does not 
reduce, it simply reduces the amount of times that deliberation takes place. 
However, the suggestion should not be discounted completely. In a system of 
governance where deliberative democracy is the primary mechanism for 
making laws, then the scale problem does present issues. However, if 
deliberative democracy were to be used in conjunction with representative 
democracy there is some validity in the suggestion that limiting situation will 
limit numbers. If deliberative democracy was only used for complex issues, 
the numbers could be limited to the stakeholders who have an interest in the 
outcome. Whilst it is likely that this will not reduce the amount of participants 
to an appropriate amount for deliberation, it is certainly a start.  
 
By limiting deliberation to certain complex issues the number of participants 
will already be slightly lowered to stakeholders who have an interest in the 
outcomes of the problem. This number itself will still be quite large. Thus, the 
solution lies in creating a small group of deliberators who are representative 
of the various stakeholders who have an interest in the outcome (Dryzek 
2001, 653). The representatives can be chosen by one of two ways: either by 
the groups themselves via elections or deliberations, or by random sampling 
(Parkinson 2003, 187). It needs to be remembered that not all those who are 
affected by the outcome will actually want to deliberate. Some may feel that 
someone else with the same interests will better represent their interests, as 
they do not have enough confidence in their communicative abilities.  ! 33!
 
There does not necessarily have to be a set formula when selecting 
participants to participate in the deliberation. For example, when selecting 
deliberators for an issue such as climate change it might be effective to 
randomly select citizens from the general population (among those who are 
interested in deliberating of course), so that a broad cross section of the 
community can be covered in an issue that affects the whole nation. However, 
when selecting deliberators to participate in an Indigenous disadvantage 
discussion it may be prudent, especially among the Indigenous population due 
to the divergence of views among each Indigenous community (Maddison 
2009, xxix), to allow deliberation between the each group to discuss who is 
best suited to represent their interests. Deliberative democracy needs to be 
flexible and adaptive to an ever-changing policy environment in order to 
promote better outcomes.    
 
Further to legitimacy is establishing a process of deliberation itself that, even 
if it produces an outcome that not everyone can agree with, no one can deny 
the legitimacy of the process through which it was reached (Gutmann 2004, 
109). This is known as procedural reciprocity of deliberative democracy. A 
set process that all parties agree to needs to be established before deliberation 
to ensure the fair and equal participation in the process among those citizens 
who wish to participate. For example, a deliberative process can be seen to 
violate principles of procedural reciprocity if it excludes a certain race from 
the process of deliberation. Clearly, it is unjust to exclude any individual (or ! 34!
group) from the deliberative process based upon their religion, race, gender 
etc. This is elaborated by Rawls where he writes: 
 
These liberalisms…cover more than procedural justice. The principles are required 
to specify the religious liberties and freedoms of artistic expression of free and equal 
citizens (Rawls 2002, 14-15).  
 
The first step in establishing a strong and legitimate deliberative democracy is 
to establish a process that encourages inclusion for those who wish to 
participate. Denying certain groups the opportunity to deliberative will not 
only raise questions over the process itself, but also affect the level of 
engagement that can be generated from the deliberation. By limiting the 
groups who may participate in the process the framework and understanding 
of the issue will become too narrow. In the case of complex policy issues this 
is the situation that is to be avoided. Better policy outcomes will more likely 
flow from a process that encourages wider inclusion. 
 
The Importance of Difference in Democracy 
 
There needs to be a recognition that legitimacy claims extend beyond a simple 
headcount of numbers. For the legitimacy of democracy to be strengthened 
there is a need for the continued improvement of democracy itself. One such 
area where improvement can be found is in the formal inclusion of typical 
segments of society who have typically been excluded from the political 
process. This has been recognised by the difference democrats who: 
   ! 35!
[S]tress the need for democratic politics to concern itself first and foremost with the 
recognition of the legitimacy and validity of the particular perspectives of 
historically oppressed segments of the population. (Dryzek 2000, 57).  
 
Dryzek has coined the improvement of democracy as “the democratization 
(sic) of democracy” (Dryzek 2000, 86). This becomes more substantial and 
effective by the inclusion of a variety of disadvantaged groups. Young has 
compiled a list of groups that she believes have been typically under-
represented in America (circa 1990) which includes women, blacks, native 
Americans, old people, poor people, disabled people, homosexuals, young 
people, and nonprofessional working people (Young 1989, 265). Young’s list 
of minority groups bears remarkable resemblance to segments of Australian 
society who have typically found it difficult to participate in politics. Thus, to 
improve democracy in Australia there needs to be the opportunity of 
involvement in the political process for the typically disadvantaged groups. 
Deliberative democracy has the potential to achieve this, despite some doubts 
from difference democrats.  
 
Difference democrats have often objected to deliberative democracy as the 
answer to inclusion. Proponents of difference argue that deliberation simply 
reinforces the existing inequality of political hierarchies (Sanders 1997, 348). 
This is because deliberation itself is an art of communication requiring 
dispassionate, reasoned, and logical speech, the form of speech which quite 
often takes place in the activity of boardrooms and parliaments (Young 2001, 
677). Thus, there will inevitably be citizens who are better equipped and more 
prepared to deliberate (the educated middle-upper class), leaving the process 
open to be dominated by a select few. As a result, deliberation departs from ! 36!
the aim of problem solving to that of confrontation with a clear set of winners 
and losers (Dryzek 2000, 65). In the context of deliberation, this is the 
scenario that is to be avoided. Deliberation is always to remain a mechanism 
for problem solving rather than confrontation. To do this, interaction needs to 
be slightly shifted from deliberation to communication.  
 
To accommodate individuals who may not be adept at deliberation Young 
suggests a move away from deliberative democracy towards communicative 
democracy (Young 1996, 128). Communicative democracy sees differences 
of culture, social perspective, and particularist commitment as a resource to 
draw on for reaching an understanding in democratic discussion, rather than 
as a division that needs to be overcome (Young 1996, 120). Communicative 
democracy is reliant upon three forms of speech; greeting, rhetoric, and story 
telling (Young 1996, 129). Whilst not straying from the argument that 
deliberative practices can provide better outcomes when working with wicked 
problems, I argue that these forms of speech, when used in a deliberative 
format, will provide an excellent means for disadvantaged groups to 
participate in deliberation. 
   
It is Young’s view that deliberative theorists tend to underestimate the power 
of greeting, thinking it is something of a banal activity (Young 1996, 129-
130). However, a simple greeting can go a long way. By engaging with each 
other before deliberations have even begun with speech that makes no 
assertions and has no content, the parties are already establishing a mutual 
respect for one another (Young 1996, 129). This can take the form of simple ! 37!
exchanges of “Hello”, “Good Morning”, and “How are you?” Without 
preliminary greeting and friendly conversation before the deliberation, the 
process may feel like a formal proceeding or contest between discourses that 
is peppered with coldness, indifference, and insult (Young 1996, 129). This is 
precisely what is to be avoided. The aim of greeting is to begin proceedings 
with recognition of mutual respect that can be communicated across cultural 
or social differences. It always needs to be remembered that this is not a 
contest between enemies. The whole point of deliberation is to come to some 
form of consensuses between ideas that will be of benefit to everyone, not just 
one party. Greeting is the first step in the process of consensus from 
deliberation.     
 
When using deliberation to overcome social problems concerned with class or 
culture there remains the problem that parties to the deliberation may not 
understand the position of the other, or even worse, misunderstand the 
position of the other. To compound this problem, it is often hard to 
communicate ones own desires, values, interests, and motives in the form of 
articulated argument. To overcome this problem, Iris Young suggests using 
the narrative technique of story telling (Young 1996, 131). The primary 
purpose of story telling is to provide a first hand account of what it is like to 
experience a particular social position (Young 1996, 131). There is something 
powerful in an Indigenous Australian explaining their own hardships and 
experiences in a remote community that has a lack of educational and health 
services. Story telling is also an effective means of espousing ones own 
values, beliefs, and culture (Young 1996, 131). Indigenous Australians have ! 38!
been using dreamtime stories for centuries to provide an account of their 
culture, beliefs, and values. Such would provide invaluable insight into their 
understandings within a deliberative format. 
 
There remains some debate among deliberative theorists regarding the place 
of rhetoric within deliberative democracy. Writers such as Dryzek argue that 
the opposite of rhetoric is not deliberation; it is Rawlsian reason, heresthetic, 
and command (Dryzek 2010, 233). Dryzek argues that this is counter-
productive to inclusion in deliberative democracy. Rawlsian reason stem from 
the works of Habermas who argued that reason and understanding only comes 
from the weight of the better argument (Habermas 1974, 85). It is an 
individualistic process whereby one’s own maturity is measured against their 
ability to comprehend arguments made (Kant 1995, 17). There is an inherent 
distrust of rhetoric in this understanding of reason. Habermas sees 
deliberation as a process that is devoid of emotion; it is simply a case of logic 
and reason. In his view, if rhetoric is introduced into this process then reason 
and logic will be corrupted (Dryzek 2000, 53). Rhetoric relies too heavily on 
the character and emotion of the speaker, rather than the content of the 
argument they are espousing. When emotion becomes the main driving force 
behind an argument the audience will begin to lose their rationality and logic, 
instead relying on raw emotional feelings that corrupt reason and 
understanding.  
 
This conception of reason and understanding bears strong resemblance to the 
form of deliberation that Sanders argues is the antithesis of participation as it ! 39!
simply reinforces the existing political hierarchy; that is, dispassionate, 
logical, and reasoned speech (Sanders 1997, 348). Sanders argument rests in 
the thought that, whilst reason and understanding are key to any form of 
deliberations, they can exclude individuals who may have something 
important to say but do not have the appropriate communicative skills to say 
it. Also, Habermas’ conception of deliberation appears to be ill equipped to 
work with complex problems in a deliberative context. By framing 
deliberation in terms of ‘the strength of the better argument’, there is almost 
an implication within this statement that there is a right or wrong answer to 
the issue in question. When working with policy quite often there is no right 
or wrong answer due to the sheer complexity of the issue. Also, by using the 
term strength, Habermas implies that deliberation is some sort of contest 
between ideals. This is not a conception of deliberation that is needed to 
promote inclusion. Rather than being viewed as a contest, deliberation needs 
to be seen as a cooperative and collaborative exploration to reach the best 
possible outcome for all parties involved.  
 
Thus, rhetoric has an important role to play in order to establish deliberation 
as an exploration rather than a contest, and to overcome any barriers of 
inequality or difference. For one, it is a common occurrence within 
deliberations that an audience simply cannot distinguish which argument 
appears to be stronger, especially in the case of expert opinion. As Dryzek 
points out, 
 
…When it comes to complex policy issues, lay deliberators operating under time 
constraints have no alternative but to make character judgements about the experts ! 40!
who are making points, especially when different experts reach different conclusions 
(Dryzek 2000, 53).  
 
Some citizens, especially when it comes to scientific or other expert 
knowledge, cannot undergo the individualistic transformative process of 
understanding identified by Kant and further advocated by Habermas (Kant 
1995, 17). When working with wicked problems, deliberation cannot be 
viewed as an individualistic process, as the problems are far too complex to 
try and understand alone. Ultimately, their final decision regarding whom they 
believe may come down to which they believe has the better character.   
 
The application Aristotelian rhetoric may also overcome any barriers of 
difference to deliberations. O’Neill has recognised three elements of 
Aristotelian rhetoric that have a place within deliberative democracy; the 
persuasion of the argument itself, the nature and character of the speaker 
(incorporating elements of voice and actions), and the use of the emotions of 
the audience (O’Neill 2002, 256-257). The use of these elements of rhetoric 
also aim to negate any stereotype of those who wish to speak, and any 
prejudicial thought there may be which will act as a barrier to the speaker 
being taken seriously (Young 1999, 156). Narrative techniques that make use 
of Aristotelian rhetoric include greeting and story telling (Young 1996, 131). 
The use of these techniques create some parity among participants who may 
come from different cultural backgrounds, and give new light and 
perspectives on issues that create particular divide among society. Within the 
use of greeting and story telling, participants can use humour, emotion, tone, 
and actions to build a rapport with other forum members, so that consensus 
may more readily be reached.   ! 41!
 
By applying the forms of speech used in a communicative democracy as 
derived by Young within a deliberative setting, any difference between groups 
who are a party to deliberation may morph from a barrier into a resource. The 
importance of greeting, story telling, and rhetoric should not be downplayed 
as they are methods of communication that foster inclusion and togetherness, 
as opposed to the confrontational form of deliberation as derived by 
Habermas. However, the inclusion of disadvantaged groups is not the only 
concern of deliberative democracy. One of the key features of deliberative 
democracy is that a better understanding of an issue will be reached due to 
engagement between parties through the process of deliberation the giving of 
reasons for their points of view (Gutmann et al. 2004, 13). The next section of 
this chapter will discuss how engagement will stem from communication.  
 
Engagement with Deliberation 
 
Establishing inclusive forms of communication is the first step to creating an 
equal setting for deliberative democracy. Attention now needs to be turned in 
how to create engagement with these forms of communication. Reciprocity is 
the key to establishing engagement. Reciprocity works in two dimensions. 
Firstly, there must be mutual respect between each of the parties to 
deliberation. If there is no mutual respect then parties will not be open to the 
arguments that they espouse. If participants are not open to arguments then 
there is no point in deliberation. For Gutmann and Thompson, reciprocity is 
the foundational principle of deliberative democracy, from which all other ! 42!
principles stem (Gutmann et al. 2004, 145). It aims at a multi level perspective 
for learning, so that true engagement with a topic can be attained and better 
reason used when discussing it (Held 2006, 233). The principle of reciprocity 
converges with both substantive and procedural principles of deliberative 
democracy.  Gutmann and Thompson warn about the dangers of bridging 
these two sets of principles as separate, as it distorts the idea of principles and 
theory of deliberative democracy (Gutmann et al. 2004, 103). Procedural 
reciprocity has been discussed earlier in the chapter in relation to legitimacy. 
This section will explore substantive reciprocity in terms of engagement.  
 
Substantive principles of reciprocity relate to the method of justification given 
for arguments by those who are espousing their views. Reasons for an 
argument provided need to be accessible, and when these reasons are provided 
they need to be accepted based on mutual respect between participants. 
However, there is some contention among theorists regarding the use of 
sectarian arguments in a deliberative setting. Dryzek states that Gutmann and 
Thompson rule out sectarian arguments when justifying positions in a 
reasoned debate, e.g. I believe divorce should be outlawed because it is 
against my religious beliefs (Dryzek 2000, 45). Dryzek does not clearly state 
the position of Gutmann and Thompson. Whilst they do state that simply 
citing a revelatory source transgresses the substantive principles of 
reciprocity, if one provides justifiable reasons as according to that source, 
then this qualifies as justifiable reasoning (Gutmann et al. 2004, 144).   
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To better illustrate substantive reciprocity and sectarian arguments I will 
provide an example relating to illicit drug use. In terms of reciprocity a 
participant of the deliberation cannot simply state that illicit drug use should 
be outlawed because it is against the will of God. For example: 
 
Now the deeds of the flesh are evident, which are: immortality, impurity, sensuality, 
idolatry, sorcery, enmities, strife, jealousy, outbursts of anger, disputes, dissensions, 
factions, envying, drunkenness, carousing, and things like these, of which I forewarn 
you, just as I have forewarned you, that those who practice such things will not 
inherit the kingdom of God (Galatians 5: 19-21)
1 
 
To simply cite this would have no reciprocal value.  However, it would have 
reciprocal value if that person were to discuss the reasons as to why God 
believes that illicit drug use should be outlawed. In this case, substantive 
reciprocity requires that the argument raised on religious beliefs be accepted, 
and not simply dismissed because it comes from a religious standing. 
Regardless of what the reasons for an argument are, when those reasons are 
provided there needs to be some form of mutual respect between parties when 
engaging the topic in a deliberative format. This is also the position of 
George, who states: 
 
By observing the principle of reciprocity in moral and political debate, one is 
indicating respect not necessarily for a position…but for the reasonableness and 
goodwill of the person who happens to hold that position (George 1999, 191-192). 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1!Although!the!word!‘drug’!isn’t!mentioned!in!this!verse,!originally!
translated,!the!Greek!word!for!‘sorcery’!is!pharmakeia,!which!is!where!
the!English!word!pharmacy!comes!from.!The!primary!meaning!is!‘the!use!
or!the!administering!of!drugs’!(usually!associated!with!sorcery!or!
idolatry)!(Deem,!2011).!!! 44!
Thus, substantive principles of reciprocity promote not only better 
engagement with the issue, but also mutual respect between those parties who 
are involved in the deliberation. 
 
There have been calls from theorists such as Rawls and Audi that deliberation 
should be secular and sectarian arguments should be ruled out completely 
from the narrow domain of public reason (Rawls 2002, 148). Rawls states that 
while they may be introduced into the public domain, at some point they must 
be justified by proper political reasons rather than justified by the 
comprehensive doctrine itself. For Rawls, this is known as the proviso (Rawls 
2002, 152). Rawls believes that such arguments remain a part of the 
philosophical and moral field, and remain separate from the political (Rawls 
2002, 148).  
 
We see a difference here between the conceptions as derived from Rawls and 
Gutmann. The idea of substantive reciprocity as derived by Gutmann and 
Thompson appears to better serve the ideals of inclusion and procedural 
reciprocity in deliberative democracy. Allowing various sectarian arguments 
into the deliberative realm encourages inclusion and engagement. Disallowing 
it will only serve to alienate a significant proportion of society, questioning 
the legitimacy and procedural reciprocity of the process itself. 
 
Reciprocity requires more than accessible reasoning when involving oneself 
in a reasoned discussion, but requires one to be a moral citizen as well. By 
moral, Gutmann and Thompson state that one needs to think outside of their ! 45!
own interests when contemplating an issue that is placed before them 
(Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 147).  This concern is also raised by Rawls 
when he states: 
 
…[I]f, when a stand off does occur, citizens simply invoke grounding reasons of 
their comprehensive views, the principle of reciprocity is violated…citizens must 
vote for the ordering of political values they sincerely think the most reasonable 
(Rawls 2002, 168).  
 
When participating in a deliberative setting citizens need to open themselves 
up to the possibility of change, and rather than fulfilling their own self 
interest, look to the greater benefit of the whole.  
 
Conclusion 
 
It is important to understand that the principles of legitimacy, difference, and 
engagement should be considered separate of each other. Each of these 
principles works with the other to promote the validity of deliberative 
democracy. Legitimacy of the process is not to be taken as a simple headcount 
of numbers to ensure there is adequate representation of interests. Legitimacy 
extends to the process of deliberation itself. The process cannot be considered 
legitimate if there has been no engagement or respect shown between the 
parties. Even so, there can be no engagement unless forms of communication 
such as greeting, story-telling, and rhetoric are allowed during deliberations to 
allow for a more equal setting where those who may not be able to deliberate 
effectively are given a chance to have their point of view discussed. From this 
envision of deliberative democracy I will move on to discuss how and why 
deliberative democracy is suited to wicked problems, and how the process ! 46!
itself will result in a better outcome in terms of legitimacy, and how it is likely 
to produce a better outcome in terms of engagement.Chapter 3 – How Deliberative Democracy can 
Provide Better Outcomes to Wicked Problems 
 
Earlier, issues of complexity, uncertainty and value divergence were analysed 
and discussed by providing contemporary examples of these issues. In the 
second chapter there was an exploration the conception of deliberative 
democracy aimed at bringing legitimacy, engagement, and difference to the 
forefront of the aims of deliberative democracy. This chapter will focus on 
addressing how, and why, this conception of deliberative democracy is best 
suited to work with wicked problems to, if not resolve, but provide better 
outcomes. The reasons why outcomes can be better are threefold: 
 
1.  Outcomes will be more legitimate as parties who have an 
interest in the outcome are a part of the deliberative process 
and are able to put their own values forward,  
2.  Deliberative practices have the ability to bridge together 
typically divided groups, values, views etc. to further 
enhance engagement and the legitimacy of the process, and 
3.  Deliberative practices have the ability to change the minds 
of participants which can create easier consensus and make 
participants evaluate arguments outside of their own values.  
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The Typical Policy Process 
 
Typically, policy development has been focused upon an empirical approach 
when working towards a solution for various policy issues. The positivist 
approach was born out of the research methods developed by theorists within 
the discipline of the physical and natural sciences. Positivism relies on the 
thought that any body of knowledge can be empirically organised to reveal 
various patterns and outliers that can then be translated into generalisations, 
thus improving our overall knowledge of the issue and surrounding problems 
(Fischer 2003, 212). Leading policy analyst theorists such as Sabatier argue 
that this is the only effective means of policy development (Fischer 2003, 
212). Sabatier envisions positivism as follows: 
 
[T]he goal is to generate a body of empirical generalizations [sic] capable of 
explaining behavior across social and historical contexts, whether communities, 
societies or cultures, independently of specific times, places or circumstances. Not 
only are such propositions essential to social and political explanation, they are seen 
to make possible effective solutions to societal problems. (Fischer 2003, 212).  
 
  
Thus, positivists argue that the analysis of empirical data surrounding issues 
as the most effective way of exploring policy and making sound decisions. 
Indeed, with the rapid rise of emerging technology that was available to the 
policy analyst, that allow for the faster processing of empirical data, there was 
a wave of support for positivism believing that empirical data analysis was the 
only way forward (Heinemen et al. 1997, 22). A driving force behind this 
support was the thought that as there is no inherent bias in numbers, the policy 
analyst could remain objective when processing data, thus creating policy that ! 49!
would reflect where the real interests and need lies (Heinemen et al. 1997, 
23).  
 
Positivism has generally been the mode of policy analysis that the Australian 
Public Service (APS) have used when faced with a policy issue. Generally, 
the approach has been quite linear. The issue is defined, and then the solution 
is developed based upon data that is available, try and test hypotheses’, and 
sampling techniques (APSC 2007, 11). Arguably, this is not a method that is 
flexible or adaptive enough to adequately work with wicked problems. This 
point has been recognised by the Australian Public Service Commission 
(APSC) who have stated that there is a need to change the behavior of the 
policy analyst within the APS when approaching policy development (APSC 
2007, 13).  
 
A positivist approach alone is not sufficient enough to work alone with 
emerging wicked problems. Quite often the empirical data relating to a 
wicked problem is far too complex and uncertain to be able to make any 
generalisations that would help build towards a policy direction. As explored 
in the first chapter, climate change is an excellent example of this point. How 
can there be any generalisations drawn from the data that is available in 
respect to future predictions for climate change, when there is no consensus 
between the experts regarding future predictions, and exactly what areas of 
the globe are to be affected more than others? Whilst there remains a place for 
positivism within policy development, there needs to be a change in the ! 50!
approach of policy developers to account for the new challenges that are 
emerging in the field of policy analysis.   
 
Coupled with this, the organisational boundaries of the APS have been 
structured quite vertically. A vertical department structure consists of a chain 
of top-down accountability, where the minister of the department rests as the 
highest source of accountability. As a result, departments have become self 
sufficient in managing their own resources and focused upon achieving the 
aims that government have set specifically for them (MAC 2004, 5), since that 
department alone are accountable. Whilst this allowed for many benefits 
associated with good policy development, such as: 
[R]ational and efficient grouping of issues, clarity of focus to support a strong results 
orientation, and en effective basis for accountability and resource allocation (MAC 
2004, 45) 
 
It has also created a culture whereby horizontal departmental communication 
(communication between the various departments) has become difficult. This 
structure is not adaptive enough to work alone on emerging problems that 
encompass multiple government departments. 
 
Legitimacy as a Result of Public Consultation 
 
A deliberative turn may be the change in behaviour that is needed when 
working with wicked problems. When there is a large amount of uncertainty 
surrounding a policy issue, it is not ideal for a single policy development 
domain to explore the unknown alone. Not only is there no certainty in 
information that is available (especially in regards to an issue such as climate ! 51!
change), but if a decision regarding an outcome is made by the single entity, 
without the inclusion of the public domain, that is ultimately discovered to be 
a bad outcome, there will likely arise serious issues of accountability and 
outcry as to why the public was not consulted. By using deliberative practices, 
these potential problems resulting from typical policy analyst methods will be 
alleviated.  
 
Deliberative practices promote both the improvement of understanding issues 
related to the policy dilemma, and an increased sense of community when 
working towards an outcome (Cooke 2000, 950). Both of which are elements 
that are generally associated with good policy development. The argument 
that deliberation will promote better understanding of the issue has its roots in 
theorists such as Mill and Arendt (Cooke 2000, 950). Cooke outlines the 
positions of both Mill and Arendt as follows: 
[B]oth Mill and Arendt see participation in public affairs as good in itself, not merely 
as instrumental in brining about, or implementing, qualitatively better political 
decisions and laws. (Cooke 2000, 950).  
 
Through the engagement that deliberative democracy promotes, participants 
may not only gain better understanding of not only the issue itself, but also the 
various differing values and beliefs that other participants to the deliberation 
posses. This is based upon the principle that justifications need to be given in 
a deliberative setting whenever an argument is made (Gutmann et al. 2004, 
15). By participating in the deliberations an individual acknowledges that they 
do not have a full understanding of the issue, and are participating not only to 
convey their own knowledge and opinions on the topic, but also to gain a ! 52!
better understanding regarding a line of thought or values they themselves 
may not have previously considered.    
 
This leads to the second point, that deliberative practices can promote a better 
sense of community. Prior to entering deliberations, an individual might only 
be considering how the policy dilemma affects their own interests. This is fair 
enough, as quite often, when we are aggrieved or passionate about something 
our vision of the problem narrows to our own interests and values. However, 
upon willingly entering deliberations, one is required to listen to other 
perspectives, and consider positions that they may not have initially thought 
relevant (Gutmann et al. 2004, 10). Whilst this not only helps to educate the 
individual, it is also working towards a community-orientated consensus on 
how an outcome can be beneficial for the whole community (Cooke 2000, 
949). Importantly, if the outcome of the proposed action reached via 
consensus during the deliberations is discovered to be an ineffective decision, 
then the decision can still be considered legitimate as it was reached through 
consensus. Rather than the decision being reached by a group of 
‘technocratic’ policy analysts basing the outcome solely on quantitative 
means (Darning 1999, 390), the result is a reflection of the wider community 
who had a chance to participate.  
 
  
Ability to Bring Together Divided Societies 
 
 
 
Deliberative democracy (or practices) has the ability to bring individuals from 
different (and in some cases contentious) backgrounds to bridge the gap ! 53!
within deeply divided societies through the form of communication and the 
location of communication. While the difference of values from the examples 
of wicked problems that were illustrated in the first chapter do not reach high 
levels of hostility between parties (e.g. where hostilities escalate to conflict as 
is often seen between nationalistic causes), there still remains division that 
affects good policy development. There remains some doubt about this ability 
of deliberative democracy among proponents of agonism and 
consociationalism who contend the claim that deliberative practices can 
bridge the gap between deeply divided societies. The former argues that the 
flaws in the rationalistic form of communication are not achievable, and the 
latter suggesting that it is too open to a variety of claims creating a flaw in the 
process.  
 
Agonism is a theory that works in similar ways to pluralism in that it seeks to 
establish a political arena for groups with particular interests to debate their 
cause not as rational citizens, but as representatives of their respective 
‘passion’ (where passion is used to denote ones own strong convictions 
towards an issue) (Mouffe 1999, 755). Agonists, such as Mouffe, argue that 
by allowing the passions of divided sectors of society to contest with each 
other the outcome will be a vibrant clash of political ideals that promote 
outcomes where the stronger passion will present itself, whilst encouraging 
respect for the adversary (Mouffe 1999, 756). This conception for resolution 
within divided societies is plausible according to Mouffe, as her main charge 
against deliberation is that it is unrealistic to expect citizens to remain rational 
whilst deliberating an issue that they feel so strongly about (Mouffe 1999, ! 54!
756). Mouffe’s position regarding deliberative democracy is essentially 
likened to the unstoppable force against the immovable object, as passions run 
so deep that neither party will be capable of reciprocity, eventually calling the 
other a ‘fool and an heretic’ (Mouffe 1999, 749). For this reason, Mouffe 
argues that deliberation is not the answer to resolution within a divided 
society.  
 
Mouffe raises an interesting question against deliberative practices; however, 
it can be answered to prove the worth of deliberative democracy, especially 
when used in the case of wicked problems. Communicative forms within a 
deliberative democracy do not necessarily have to remain rational as Mouffe 
argues they do. As explored in the second chapter, there remains a place in 
deliberative practices for less rational forms of communication such as 
rhetoric, jokes, gossip, and story telling, all of which are used to accommodate 
the engagement of discourse (Dryzek 2005, 224). To determine the merit, 
worth, and reciprocal value that Mouffe doubts is capable of achieving within 
the deliberative process in question, Dryzek has put forward a three stage to 
test that participants need to ask themselves: 
 
[C]ommunication is required to be first, capable of inducing reflection: second, 
noncoercive: and third, capable of linking the particular experience of an individual 
or group with some more general point of principle. (Dryzek 2005, 224).  
 
 The third element is important to keep in mind when working with wicked 
problems. Engagement will be less likely to end in hostility if the focus of the 
deliberation is on specific needs (such as education or health), rather than a 
general value (Dryzek 2005, 225). If engagement is less likely to end in ! 55!
hostility, then it is more likely that participants will be reciprocal and more 
open to other arguments.  
 
To illustrate this point it is best to use an example of a wicked problem from 
the first chapter. Arguably, from the examples used in the first chapter, the 
sets of values that stand in the starkest contrast are those relating to the moral 
issues surrounding illicit drug use. Illicit drug use is generally divided 
between those who believe that the use of drugs is morally wrong and should 
thus be outlawed completely, opposed to those who take a more liberal 
approach and would rather a decriminalised system with a focus on harm 
mimimisation. If this issue were to be the subject of deliberation, a story that 
would generally emerge would be a harrowing one of an addicts fallout with 
their family and eventual turn to a life of crime. This story could be perceived 
in two ways, depending on the sets of values that are used to approach it. It 
can be told in terms of sympathy for the addict as s/he clearly has problems 
and is in need of help (this is the liberal’s perception of the story), or that it 
was their own fault for turning to drugs in the first place (the moral 
character’s perception). Both of the potential terms are likely to ignite 
hostilities between parties, as illicit drug policy is an issue that has affected so 
many families. However, if the focus were to be on the specific needs of 
addicts, rather than on the general values, then consensus is much more likely 
to be achievable (Dryzek 2005, 225). For example, if the story were to be told 
in terms of mental heath issues, such as the effects of long-term drug use and 
addiction.  
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This idea has been put into practice to great effect in Turkey regarding their 
education policy. In Turkey young Islamic women typically wore headscarves 
to denote their exclusion from secular universities (Dryzek 2005, 225). At the 
start of 2002, the issue was reframed in terms of the education needs of young 
women and the sentiment that it is a basic human right that education be 
available to everyone. This new perspective gained much more ground after 
the reframing, and the policy dilemma looked much less intractable than 
previously (Dryzek 2005, 225). This is a promising sign for the proposition of 
deliberation in Australia, showing that typically intractable issues are capable 
of reaching public consensus.     
 
It is important to now turn to the criticisms from consociationalism. 
Proponents of consociationalism argue that it is the only form of association 
that is a viable option when working with divided values. Consociationalists 
contend that deliberative democracy is far too open to diverse claims to be 
able to properly process them properly and reach decisive outcomes (Dryzek 
2005, 224). In light of this, consociationalists argue that the only workable 
solution to a society (or value set) that is divided is to establish a parliament 
that consists of leaders from each of the ethnic, value, or cultural groups 
(depending on how the society is divided), where power is divided as a 
coalition (O’Flynn 2010, 572). Each leader is to be a representative of their 
group’s interests, and each would have a power of veto. Theorists, such as 
Lijphart, have championed the idea of consociationalism arguing that it can 
ensure that stability be maintained across deeply divided societies (Dryzek 
2006, 50).  ! 57!
 
However, one could argue that the aims of consociationalism are too short 
term, aiming at conflict management rather than conflict resolution, or indeed 
resolution of the problem itself (O’Flynn 2010, 572). In the context of wicked 
problems, it can be argued that this is not an ideal solution. By recognising 
that the differences between parties are so contentious that reconciliation 
between views can only be managed, rather than resolved, this could (in 
effect) corrupt any chance of reciprocity between the parties. In turn, this will 
affect the legitimacy, and also the possibility, of any desirable outcome 
actually being reached.  In fact, in the context of wicked problems, the 
criticism made by consociationalists (that deliberative democracy is too open 
to diverse views) actually appears to be further reason why deliberative 
democracy is best suited to working with wicked problems. This will be 
highlighted by using the wicked problem of climate change. 
 
As outlined in the first chapter, an element that turns a policy problem into a 
wicked problem is value divergence between parties to the issue. However, 
whilst this does contribute to the complexity of the overall policy problem, it 
is also helps to work towards a solution, especially when coupled with 
deliberative practices. This is best explained by using exploring the policy 
development of climate change. Garnaut explains that it is dangerous when 
developing policy (in relation to climate change), to be governed by a narrow 
set of values, as this will lead to a narrow conception of the issues (Garnaut 
2011, 13).  
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To apply this to climate change, one cannot be solely concerned with the neo-
liberal economist value set concerning the potential short term economic loss 
as a result of mitigating the possible effects of climate change (Garnaut 2011, 
14). To do so would be to frame the debate too narrowly. Likewise, it would 
be dangerous to focus on the environmentalists’ claim that we need to do 
everything we can in order to mitigate to the effects of climate change in the 
future simply because there is too much uncertainty surrounding the 
projections of what will actually happen. There needs to be an acceptance of 
as many views as possible in order to broaden understanding of the policy 
issue. Deliberative practice is capable of accommodating such a diverse range 
of views, and processing them to allow participants to question their own 
values, and reach consensus on an appropriate course of action.  
 
Deliberative practices can accommodate as many views as possible, simply 
because it is the goal of deliberative democracy (Gutmann et al. 2004, 11). By 
turning to deliberative democracy, there has already been recognition by 
citizens and officials alike that they have an incomplete understanding of the 
issue (Gutmann et al. 2004, 12). The best way to remedy an incomplete 
understanding is to include a diverse range of views and values: 
 
A well constituted deliberative forum provides an opportunity for advancing both 
individual and collective understanding… [P]articipants can learn from each other, 
come to recognize [sic] their individual and collective and misapprehensions, and 
develop new views and policies that can more successfully withstand critical 
scrutiny. (Gutmann et al. 2004, 12).  
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A deliberative forum that is more representative of all the interests and values 
that are a party to the issue will generally be more likely to achieve this than 
one that is closed to such diversity.  
 
Deliberation Can Change Minds 
 
To promote the legitimacy of a policy direction that is chosen it is important 
that parties to the decision agree that that it is the right way forward. This 
means that there needs to be a process in place that is capable of changing the 
minds of stakeholders who have conflicting views. It has been a common 
question mark over deliberative practices as to whether or not it can actually 
change the minds of participants; given that quite often participants who are 
deliberating over something that is important to them may be quite stalwart 
(Dryzek 20005, 229). However, given the right location and process of 
deliberation, a change in the mind of participants is possible. As a result this 
means that deliberative practices could be the ideal means of working with 
wicked problems.  
 
The location and process of deliberation is important when trying to achieve a 
change in the mind of participants. Fung has devised a scale ranging from hot 
to cold (describing the process and location) to explain when a change in 
mind of a participant is possible (Fung 2003, 349). Hot deliberation would 
occur when the deliberation is tied to a sovereign authority, participants are 
individuals who have a lot at stake on the outcome, and the deliberation itself 
is a one off occurrence (Dryzek 2005, 229). In this situation a change in the ! 60!
mind of a participant is not likely since the decision will be made quickly and 
authoritatively by the sovereign body, meaning that neither party are likely to 
concede, and, if they actually are persuaded they will most likely hide such 
persuasion for fear of appearing weak and losing credibility (Dryzek 2005, 
229). This is not the method of deliberation that should be used when working 
with wicked problems. Nor is the other end of the spectrum where 
deliberation is cold. A cold deliberation setting would involve participants 
who have no stake in the outcome, but have some knowledge of the policy 
problem (Fung 2003, 349). Deliberation would take place in an informal 
setting, and the result would be purely advisory. By choosing participants who 
have nothing at stake in the outcome it is likely that a change in mind will 
occur, as they have nothing to lose as a result. (Dryzek 2005, 229). This is not 
ideal to work with wicked problems, because as explained in the second 
chapter, it is important to have those stakeholders who are actually affected by 
the outcome involved in the deliberation to promote the legitimacy of the 
process.   
  
Deliberation can change the views of participants when the process and 
location find some middle ground in between the hot and cold spectrum. An 
ideal model would inform the participants that deliberation is not a one off 
forum, rather, it is a process that works over time with the issue being 
revisited regular to allow participants time to think over previous points, and 
dwell on issues that might not have previously been considered (Dryzek 2005, 
229). Dryzek argues a similar point: 
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With time, degree of activation of concern on particular issues can change. 
Individuals can shift from partisanship to moderation to apathy and vice versa, and 
may even come to adopt different attitudes… [D]eliberation induced reflection can 
eventually lead an individual to change his or her mind. But he or she can most 
easily admit that in a different setting, at another time and place, with different 
participants, where face and credibility associated with having staked out a position 
are no longer decisive (Dryzek 2005, 229).   
 
 
It is also important that deliberation should occur in an informal setting, with 
as little interference from sovereign authority as possible (in fact the 
sovereign’s role should be to facilitate and mediate the discussion). This is to 
further instill the point that the end result of the deliberation is the product of 
the people themselves, not the sovereign (of course, if the sovereign is a party 
to the issue then participation will be more than welcome). Any deliberation 
that is tied to sovereign authority may make participants more suspicious of 
the process, making them more hesitant to persuasion (Dryzek 2005, 230).  
 
Should these conditions be met than the likelihood that participants will feel 
more open and relaxed to the deliberation process will increase, allowing 
them to be potentially be persuaded by an argument that they may not have 
previously considered. This is important when working with wicked 
problems, as it builds consensus and a better sense of community among 
participants. It is also more likely to promote a sense of reciprocity among the 
participants, promoting better understanding and engagement with the issue.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The typical positivist approach of the policy analyst now appears to be too 
inflexible and lacks adaption to adequately work with wicked policy issues ! 62!
alone. It is not a proposition that positivist practices be ruled out completely; 
they do still have a role within policy analysis relating to wicked problems. 
Rather, the policy analysts cannot do this alone. Wicked problems are too 
complex and uncertainty to be tackled by a single policy development entity. 
There needs to be a move toward community consultation in the form of 
deliberative practices to work with the policy analyst and positivist methods. 
 
Deliberative practices could promote better outcomes, both substantively and 
procedurally, when working with wicked problems. Procedurally, the benefits 
of deliberative democracy are quite persuasive. Rather than a single policy 
development entity working on the policy alone, deliberative practices will 
promote a policy procedure that encourages wide participation from those 
who have an interest in the outcome. This builds a strong sense of legitimacy 
and community in any decision that is reached as a result of the deliberation 
between parties. Legitimacy is important to any policy direction, as if the 
decision that is reached is ultimately the wrong one, there can be no outcry 
from the public claiming that it was not what they wanted in the first place.  
 
Substantively, deliberate practices have the ability to change the minds of 
participants given the correct location and form of deliberations. Through the 
justifications for arguments given in the deliberative arena, participants will 
expand their knowledge of the issue beyond their own interests and values. 
Consensus (and legitimacy in the decision) will be more readily reached as a 
result, meaning that it is likely that the outcome will be the correct one as a 
result of fierce deliberation and consensus between citizens. Even if the ! 63!
outcome proves to be the incorrect path forward, it will remain legitimate as 
all those affected had the opportunity to participate, and there was a consensus 
reached that it is the correct path forward.  
 
Deliberative democracy does not take away the complexity and uncertainty of 
wicked problems, but through the legitimacy, community, and engagement 
that it promotes, it certainly makes these elements appear much more 
bearable.Conclusion 
Summary of Arguments 
 
This discussion has put forward the case for using deliberative practices in 
combination with existing practices of policy development to potentially 
create better outcomes when working with wicked policy problems. To 
properly explore the case for deliberative practices the discussion was divided 
into three chapters. The first chapter explored the idea of a wicked policy 
problem, the second discussed a theoretical grounding of deliberative 
democracy, and the third applied deliberation to wicked problems to highlight 
the benefits of using deliberative practices.  
 
It was noted in the first chapter that Head states a tame policy issue will turn 
into a wicked problem when there a high levels of uncertainty, value 
divergence, and complexity (Head 2008. 103). To further explore this idea 
each element (uncertainty, value divergence, and complexity), was discussed 
individually to properly show when each element reaches a high level.  
 
The challenge that climate change presents highlights how a policy issue can 
reach high levels of uncertainty. The lack of consensus and certainty among 
scientific experts on future projections of the effects of climate change have 
spilled over in the wider community creating further social and economic 
uncertainty. As a result, nations are hesitant to lock into any international 
agreement, as they cannot guarantee they can abide by it due to their ! 65!
economic growth, and citizens have turned to the political parties whom they 
have typically voted with for guidance.  
 
When dealing with value divergence it is important to remember that this does 
not refer to a disagreement between stakeholders in an issue, but a more deep-
seated moral conflict between two or more values. With this in mind the 
wicked policy issue of illicit drug use highlights when value divergence 
reaches high levels. There is a clear moral conflict between those who argue 
that the use of illicit drugs is immoral and wrong, and should thus be outlawed 
completely, and those who believe that a harm minimisation model should be 
created with the use of illicit drugs decriminalised.  
 
Indigenous disadvantage has been a policy issue that has been present for a 
long period of time but never been resolved. This can be attributed to the 
sheer complexity of the issue itself. Complexity often arises because of the 
breadth of the problem. For example, Indigenous disadvantage involves issues 
of employment, health, remote communities, and a history of poor treatment. 
Such complexity requires an integrated multi-dimensional approach rather 
than approached by a single government department. For these reasons, the 
policy issue of indigenous disadvantage represents how policy issues reach 
high levels of complexity. 
 
The presence of uncertainty, value divergence, or complexity can cause 
problems when developing policy, but when all three are present the difficulty 
of developing successful policy substantially rises. This is why the problem ! 66!
enters the realm of wickedness. It is important to remember that the elements 
do not work separate of each other. It is not uncommon to have issues of 
complexity involve uncertainty and vice versa. Each of the contemporary 
examples of policy issues that were given above can be considered wicked 
problems in their own right. But by highlighting one core element of the 
problem itself a clearer position of that element is given to illustrate the true 
nature of a wicked problem. 
 
Before putting forward the case for using deliberative practices when working 
with wicked problems it is important to discuss and explore deliberative 
democracy. The second chapter outlined a theoretical grounding of 
deliberative democracy, highlighting the principles of legitimacy, difference, 
and engagement. These three principles are important in explaining why 
deliberative democracy can be an effective theory when working towards 
mutual respect between citizens, better understanding of issues, and effective 
policy responses. 
 
Traditional claims of legitimacy within deliberative democracy stem from the 
argument that a decision can only be considered legitimate when everyone 
who wants to deliberate on the issue has been given the opportunity to (Cohen 
1989, 18). However, the tension between achieving true deliberation and an 
all-inclusive process can make this a difficult aim to achieve. That is, when 
the numbers of participants begin to rise, the process shifts from deliberation 
to a forum of speech making (Parkinson 2003, 118). To counter-act this, 
deliberation can be limited to certain times (such as dealing with complex ! 67!
issues), and by limiting the participants to those who are affected by the issue. 
It also needs to be remembered that legitimacy does not only come from a 
headcount of numbers, but also from procedural reciprocity. Procedural 
reciprocity requires that if a decision is reached that not all participants can 
agree to, none can deny the legitimacy of the process through which the 
decision was reached (Gutmann et al. 2004, 103).  
 
Difference in deliberative democracy is an important principle, as deliberation 
can provide an opportunity for those who have typically been alienated from 
the political process to participate in deliberation. To achieve this, Young 
argues that a more egalitarian form of communication needs to be used 
(Young 1996, 128). Rather than typical deliberation that is seen in 
boardrooms and parliaments, Young suggests that forms of communication 
such as greeting, story telling, and rhetoric be used. Deliberation can be 
intimidating form of communication, however, if Young’s suggestion is taken 
into account then those who may not be adept at deliberation are still given 
the opportunity to.    
 
Finally, to achieve real engagement within deliberations the principles of 
substantive reciprocity need to be recognised. This involves not only 
respecting the person who made the argument, but also the argument itself 
(Gutmann et al. 2004, 144). The argument cannot be dismissed simply 
because one does not believe, it needs to be accepted and dwelled on. If 
participant are to participate effectively in deliberation, and for deliberation to ! 68!
reach its aims, then substantive reciprocity needs to be recognised and 
followed.  
 
The third, and final, chapter of the discussion applied the benefits that can be 
attained from deliberation to working with wicked problems. The benefits that 
can spring from using deliberation include greater legitimacy in decisions that 
stem from public consultation; the ability of deliberation to bridge together 
divided parties, and the fact that deliberation can change minds. It is important 
to note that at no point is deliberation advanced to replace our current system 
of policy development, but rather to work with it in the case of wicked 
problems.  
 
The typical policy process has relied on empiricism, that is, the belief that any 
field of knowledge can be broken down by statistical analysis, then 
generalisations can be drawn from the analysis of such statistics (Fischer 
2003, 212). In conjunction with this, government departments have been 
structured quite vertically, that is, information is shared within departments 
and hardly horizontally across departments. Many wicked problems are also 
whole of government problems, and by applying deliberative practices to such 
problems there will be greater legitimacy for that decision as all who wish to 
have their say have had the opportunity to do so.  
 
Deliberation can also bridge together divided parties. As explored earlier in 
the discussion, value divergence does not refer to a disagreement between two 
or more stakeholders to an issue, but to a deep seeded moral disagreement ! 69!
between two or more values. This section of the chapter explored how 
deliberative practices can be applied to possibly bridge the divergence 
between the contrasting values involved with illicit drug use. By reframing the 
deliberation in terms of broader needs, rather than specific values, the issue 
appears less intractable and progress can be made.  
 
Finally, deliberation in the right environment can change minds. In order to 
further promote the legitimacy of the decision made as a result of the 
deliberative process, deliberation needs to have the capacity to potentially 
change the minds of participants. This section of the chapter distinguished 
between hot and cold deliberation. Either end of the hot or cold spectrum is 
not an appropriate environment for deliberation, but rather there needs to be 
ground found in the middle where participants who are affected by the 
decision are involved, deliberation is not a one off occurrence (which allows 
for participants to dwell on various arguments made), and deliberation is not 
tied to any sovereign authority as there can be a mistrust of government 
powers.   
 
Why is this Important? 
 
The wicked problems that Australia face today have created a division and 
polarisation of issues, the like of which has rarely been experienced on such a 
large scale. There seems to be a lack of engagement between those who have 
opposing views and values, with each party preferring to stand stalwart with 
fellow citizens who share their own views, simply becoming more entrenched ! 70!
within them. This is evidenced by the recent protests in March of this year 
against the Gillard government outside Parliament House in Canberra over the 
introduction of the carbon tax. The protest, whilst relatively peaceful, 
consisted of aggrieved citizens holding signs that were distasteful and 
vindictive slurs against our Prime Minister (Wright 2011). There seems little 
value in holding signs that state “JuLIAR…Bob Brown’s Bitch” and “Ditch 
the Witch” (Wright 2011). The fact that citizens feel this is a better way to 
promote their cause (through vindictive signs), than to engage with citizens 
who agree with the carbon tax is a discouraging sign of Australian politics. 
 
However, the protests did not end in March. During October of this year the 
Gillard government passed the carbon tax through the House of 
Representatives (Johnston 2011). This was not done easily, as protestors in 
the public viewing gallery constantly marred the session of parliament. The 
protestors screamed personal insults onto the Prime Minister, and chanted 
statements such as “Democracy is Dead” during question time over the 
legislation (Johnston 2011). Again, this is a discouraging sign for Australian 
politics. One could argue that “Democracy is Dead” when protestors feel the 
need to resort to such distasteful disruptions of parliament. It seems that a 
more productive and constructive way to spend one’s time would be to 
research why the measure has been introduced and engage with other people 
over the topic, rather than hurl insults at our Prime Minister. 
 
Also, the polarisation of issues has been a worrying trend within Australian 
media and politics. In recent years the media have simplistically framed issues ! 71!
in terms of for and against, “Are you for or against this issue?” This 
simplification has been applied to issues regarding asylum seekers and the 
carbon tax. However, these are not issues where one can simply state if they 
are for or against, without giving any reasoning. The issues are not so one 
dimensional as this, and encompass many other variables. As a result, this has 
created mere skin-deep analysis of the issues, and further polarised parties to 
the problem.    
 
The typical empirical policy process that has been used is no longer flexible 
enough to work alone with wicked problems. Wicked problems are far too 
complex and uncertain to be able to be broken down by numbers. Rather, by 
actively encouraging citizens to deliberate with each other over issues they 
feel so strongly about, vindictive protests, such as those discussed above, may 
no longer occur. Citizens will be forced to reason with each other in an 
environment where they are actively encouraged to dwell on issues and think 
outside the box. By dwelling on points that they may not have previously 
considered, participants may realise that the issue is not as one-dimensional as 
they previously thought it was, and as a result, one may even change their 
mind over how they view the problem.  The mutual respect that deliberation 
encourages can create a stronger sense of community between participants 
and strengthen the legitimacy of the decision itself.  
 
This is not a proposal for the replacement of the current methods of policy 
analysis with deliberative democracy, but rather that deliberative democracy 
be used with to allow for a more flexible and adaptive approach when ! 72!
working with wicked problems. The case for the use of deliberative practices 
when working with wicked problems is strong; there can be greater legitimacy 
as a result of public consultation, it can have the ability to bridge together 
typically divided parties, and may even lead participants to change their minds 
over how they frame the issue. It also appears far more productive to have 
contrasting viewpoints deliberate together over an issue, than simply 
protesting with vindictive picket signs.  
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